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jurisdiction. Counsel from outsidethejurisdiction (suchas aneighboring
county) may be the shield that local counsel needs to test the court's
tolerance on sensitive issues without fear of negative consequences. For
example, outside counsel may be better able to raise issues of racial
discrimination by police or the Commonwealth Attorney's office or even
the judge, and be more aggressive in claims ofprosecutorial misconduct,
thus giving the defense greater leeway in its approach to the case.
I1. Maintaining Credibility in the Penalty Phase after a Guilty
Verdict
Credibility is at theheart of an effective defense and, therefore, must
be a key consideration in planning every capital defense strategy. The
jury's first impression of the defendant is paramount. Unfortunately,
because of the dual nature of the capital case, the defense must, from the
very beginning, investigate the potential jurors' views about the death
penalty through voir dire. The defense may lose some credibility if the
same lawyer is in the odd position of having to argue the client's
innocence just after asking the jurors questions about the appropriateness
of the death penalty during voir dire if the defendant is found guilty. By
using the attorney who will concentrate on the penalty phase to conduct
voir dire, however, the defense can create a buffer between voir dire and
the guilt-innocence phase of the trial.
Isolating the guilt-innocence attorney from any negative associa-
tions with the penalty phase during voir dire will thus bolster defense
credibility at the guilt-innocence phase. The penalty phase will be
similarly benefited. The lawyer whose argument for acquittal has been
rejected at the guilt-innocence phase is likely to be completely drained.
Capital cases require the defense to continue straight through sentencing,
allowing no time for the defense to regroup. Instead of spending the
remaining stage of the trial trying to shift gears, the guilt-innocence
4 If the same attorney argues at the guilt-innocence phase that the
defendant is innocent and thenhas the defendant "come clean" during the
penalty trial for mitigation, both counsel and defendant are likely to lose
credibility with the jury. Juries are likely to give more latitude to the
client if the defense appears to be as consistent and forthright as possible.
At a minimum, a fresh face can soften the inconsistencies in the defense
attorney should assume a different role in the defense. Co-counsel, who
has played a more passive role in the guilt-innocence phase, has pre-
served energy, focus and neutrality and is thus better prepared to present
mitigating evidence to the jury during sentencing. Without that switch,
it may be impossible to recover from a guilty verdict.
Jurors may also hold a single attorney to a much higher standard of
consistency in the presentation of both phases of the trial. While it is
always difficult for defense attorneys to synchronize post-guilt mitiga-
tion defenses with pre-verdict innocence theories so that the jury does not
question the defense's sincerity, a new face in the sentencing phase may
leaven the effect in the jury. The split trial approach can be especially




Defendants are constitutionally entitled to quality legal assistance
sufficient to prepare an adequate defense at trial; in the context of capital
litigation, this means two attorneys must share the heavy responsibilities
of representation. Capital defense attorneys can use co-counsel to tackle
the amount of material before them by using the natural division between
the guilt-innocence and penalty phases. Splitting the trial responsibilities
according to the two phases will refine the focus of the defense attorneys
involved. A more definite and manageable workload will allow for a
more aggressive and attentive adversarial team. More importantly, this
division may be crucial to the credibility of the defense throughout the
trial. Not only might a jury be more likely not to convict, a credible
defense team has a better chance of rescuing the penalty phase from the
inherent prejudices against a defendant deemed guilty of a capital
offense.
by having the jury's verdict acknowledged by the new counsel ("al-
though we disagree, we accept the jury's hard work in rendering the
guilty verdict"), but then explaining that the trial has now moved into a
completely different set of considerations ("even if guilty, does the
defendant deserve to die?").
TAKING THE OFFENSIVE: PROACTIVE USE OF THE RULES OF EVIDENCE
BY: ANGELA DALE FIELDS
Defense attorneys tend to think of the rules of evidence defensively
how do I minimize the damage? - rather than as tools for actively
putting the defense case before thejury. However, the Virginia practitio-
ner often can use the evidentiary concepts behind the Federal Rules of
Evidence to take a proactive stance in defending clients in the state
courts. This article looks at the concepts behind several federal rules and
suggests how the rules can be creatively used to make criminal defense
in Virginia more successful. While I focus on the federal rules, where
possible, I have drawn parallels to Virginia evidence law. Therefore, this
article is intended not only for attorneys who defend against federal
prosecutions, but for the Virginia state practitioner as well. I have
compiled here just a fraction of the inventive uses possible for federal law
concepts in Virginia state courts. My hope is that experienced attorneys
will not only use this article as a resource, but will allow it to inspire their
ability to invent other ways to use federal law concepts in state courts.
1. Keeping The Government's Evidence In Context
A. Federal Rule 106
Imagine that during the Commonwealth's case, the prosecutor
introduced only the incriminating portions of your client's written
statement. You knew that, read as a whole, the statement was exculpa-
tory. But by the time your case-in-chief is heard and the exculpatory parts
of the statement are finally read, the jury may have decided upon your
client's guilt. Persuading the jurors that there is another side to the story
will be difficult. Fortunately, Federal Rule 106 provides a more palatable
option than waiting your turn: "When a writing or recorded statement or
part thereof is introduced by a party, an adverse party may require the
introduction at that time of any other part or any other writing or recorded
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statement which ought in fairness to be considered contemporaneously
with it."1
Rule 106 allows defense counsel to do two things: to prevent a
misleading impression from being given to the jury, and, more impor-
tantly, to put the defense in front of the jury during the Commonwealth's
case.2 The advisory committee notes stress that the rule does not "in any
way" prohibit cross examination on the matter by the defense or further
development of the subject during the defense's case.3 Use of the rule,
however, is limited to "writings and recorded statements."
Rule 106 is an expression of the rule of completeness, which has
long been used to prevent one side from giving a misleading impression
to the jury.4 Most courts make the determination of admissibility under
Rule 106 based upon "fitness for purpose" and necessity: the fitness of
the excluded portion to prevent the jury from being misled and the
necessity for such prevention.
5
An objection to the admissibility of 106 evidence for lack of
necessity will claim that the written or recorded statement admitted into
evidence was complete, and, therefore obviated the need for the particu-
lar document or portion of a document the defense wants to introduce. A
reasonably complete unit of material can be one document, several
documents, or merely a portion of a document. 6 Defense counsel's
response to such an argument will depend upon the facts, but she should
consider her response well in advance. Keep in mind that Rule 106 also
allows "related writings," not merely other parts of the admitted docu-
ment, to be admitted to give a fair picture and that any misunderstanding
or distortion caused by the admitted portions makes the offered portion
automatically relevant under rules 401 and 402.
7
One unresolved question is whether otherwise inadmissible evi-
dence becomes admissible if offered under Rule 106.8 An instruction
limiting use of the evidence by the jury may convince a court to admit
evidence which is prohibited by another rule but should be admissible
under Rule 106. Some courts have adopted a compromise position,
holding that if a limiting instruction admonishing the jury to use the
offered evidence solely for the purpose of correcting any misleading
impression is not adequate to cure the prejudice, then the misleading
evidence must be excluded as well.9
The Fourth Circuit faced this problem in the context of the intersec-
tion of Rule 106 and Rule 403 (evidence excludable if prejudice out-
weighs probative value). In Merrick v. Mercantile-Safe Deposit & Trust
Co.,10 the court, applying the term "fairness"in Rule 106, held that, if the
prejudicial value of the evidence outweighs its probativeness such that
1 Fed. R. Evid. 106 (amended 1987). See also United States v.
LeFevour, 798 F.2d 977, 981 (7th Cir. 1986).
2 Nancy Hollander, et. al., Taking Advantage of Underutilized
Rules of Evidence, The Champion, Aug. 1994, at 4-10. There are ethical
considerations accompanying this use which are beyond the scope of this
article.
3 Fed. R. Evid. 106, advisory committee notes, 56 F.R.D. 183,201.
4 Id. For a full understanding of the rule of completeness in the
context of allowing cross-examination see United States v. Smith, 794
F.2d 1333, 1335 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 938 (1986).
5 The fitness determination includes consideration of the ability of
the excluded portion to explain what was admitted; to place the admitted
portion in context; to avoid misleading the jury; or to ensure a fair and
impartial understanding of what was admitted. Hollander, supra note 2,
at 5 (citing UnitedStates v.Boylan, 898 F.2d 230,256-257 (1 stCir.), cert.
denied, 498 U.S. 849 (1990); United States v. Sweiss, 814 F.2d 1208,
1211-12 (7th Cir. 1987); United States v. Walker, 652 F.2d 708,710 (7th
Cir. 1981)).
the evidence is excludable under 403, then it is not admissible under
106.11 A request for a limiting instruction to correct any perceived
prejudice might help to avoid the applicability of Merrick. In situations
involving objections to admissibility based upon rules other than Rule
403, "fairness" may not dictate exclusion, and the Fourth Circuit may be
more likely to admit the evidence.
Defense counsel should, of course, stress the other side of the coin:
"fairness" may require the admission of otherwise excludable evidence
so that the jury will not be misled. For example, because of the specter
of promiscuity created by such testimony, it may seem unfairly prejudi-
cial to allow a defendant to introduce documentary evidence that the
prosecutrix in a rape case had sexual intercourse with other men on the
day of the alleged crime. However, if the defense is that the DNA tests
on the semen were incomplete and unreliable, such evidence may be
necessary to explain to the jury why the tests were unreliable.
Rule 106 also allows defense counsel some control over the timing
of the introduction of the evidence. It is not uncommon, for instance, for
judges to justify exclusion of exculpatory testimony "for the time being"
with assurances that the defendant will have the opportunity to rebut after
the prosecution rests. This is precisely the type of evil, however, that the
authors of Rule 106 intended to prevent: allowing irreversible beliefs to
form in the jurors' minds before they have heard all of the evidence. In
the DNA example, Rule 106 would allow written or recorded statements
which indicated other sexual relationships to be introduced during the
government's case. Defense counsel would also benefit from the ability
to present to the jury, during the government's case, the core of the
defense - that police investigation was inadequate, and therefore, it is
impossible to find the client guilty beyond a reasonable doubt without
first determining the identity and culpability of the woman's other sexual
partners.
B. Application of the Rule 106 Concept in Virginia
In Virginia, the basic concept behind Rule 106, the rule of complete-
ness, is set out in Stonestreet v. Doyle,12 an 1881 case which held that
because the defendants offered into evidence the contents of a letter
written to their agent, they could not object to the admission of the agent's
answer to the letter. The Stonestreet court stated, "[t]he rule is well settled
that when letters are laid before a jury the parties affected by them have
a right to the entire correspondence, that the true meaning and extent of
what is written may be fully understood." 13 As Stonestreet's rule of
6 Id. at 6 (citing Boylan, supra note 5, 898 F.2d at 256).
7 Id. at 5 (citing Beech Aircraft Corp. v. Rainey, 488 U.S. 153, 173
(1988)). See also United States v. Dorrell, 758 F.2d 427, 434-435 (9th
Cir. 1985) (gov't may redact confession under Rule 106 if redacted
portion is irrelevant and does not change meaning of confession.) Id.
8 Id. (comparing UnitedStates v. Sutton, 801 F.2d 1346,1367 (D.C.
Cir. 1986) (fairness may require inadmissible evidence to be considered
contemporaneously with the proffered evidence) with United States v.
Costner, 684 F.2d 370,373 (6th Cir. 1982) (Rule 106 is only a correction
for order of proof problems, not a vehicle for admission of otherwise
inadmissible evidence)). See also United States v. Woolbright, 831 F.2d
1390, 1395 (8th Cir. 1987) (identical to proposition in Sutton).
9 Id. (citing Le Fevour, 798 F.2d at 980-81 (including two good
examples of attempts to use Fed. R. Evid. 106)).
10 855 F.2d 1095 (4th Cir. 1988).
11 Merrick, 855 F.2d at 1104.
12 75 Va. 356 (1881).
13 Id. at 375.
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completeness has not been affirmatively overturned, defense counsel
would be reasonable in believing that it operates in Virginia today.
However, because no other Virginia appellate court has used the rule
since 1881,14 defense counsel should be prepared to articulate Rule
106's "fairness" rationale to the trial court to justify the admission of
evidence during the Commonwealth's case.
15
II. Exposing The Government's Witnesses As The Culprits
A. Federal Rule 404(b)
Imagine a case in which your defense is that the state's star witness
is the guilty party, or at least, the primary participant. During impeach-
ment of this witness, you might be able to offer the jury your defense
theory by showing the witness' motive, opportunity, intent, preparation,
and plan to commit the crime. The jury may find that the witness is guilty
of the crime and, therefore, your client is not. But even if the jury finds
your client guilty, you have damaged the state's case, which may result
in a lighter sentence recommendation from the jury or, in a capital case,
may create some doubt, even if not a reasonable doubt, regarding the
defendant's culpability. In effect, you have introduced mitigation evi-
dence during the prosecution's case-in-chief.
Rule 404(b) is a possible avenue for eliciting information about the
government's witnesses which tends to prove that those witnesses were
the culpable parties rather than your client. Rule 404(b) provides that:
Evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts is not admissible to
prove the character of a person in order to show action in
conformity therewith. It may, however, be admissible for other
purposes, such as proof of motive, opportunity, intent, prepa-
ration, plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake or
accident, provided that upon request by the accused, the
prosecution in a criminal case shall provide reasonable notice
14 The court in Perkins v. Lane, 82 Va. 59 (1886), without
mentioning the rule of completeness, held that "a party against whom a
statement is being offered is entitled to have the entire statement admitted
into evidence." 2 Charles E. Friend, The Law of Evidence in Virginia, §
18-49 at 254 (4th ed. 1993 & Supp. 1995) (citing Perkins).
15 As far as the exclusion of relevant evidence is concerned,
Virginia uses a balancing test much like the Rule 403 test. 1 Friend, supra
note 14, § 11-2, at451 (1993 & Supp. 1995) (citing among others Coe v.
Commonwealth, 231 Va. 83, 87, 340 S.E.2d 820, 823 (1986)).
16 Fed. R. Evid. 404(b) (amended 1987, 1991).
17 Hollander, supra note 2, at 6 (citing United States v. McClure,
546 F.2d 670 (5th Cir. 1977) (exclusion of evidence that a DEA agent had
intimidated three other people into selling drugs is reversible error when
the defendant's defense is that of entrapment)). See also the Fourth
Circuit case of United States v. Stamper, 766 F. Supp. 1396 (W.D.N.C.
1991) (when no physical evidence linked the defendant to the crime, the
complainant's previous allegations of sexual abuse by three other men
were admissible to prove her motive of manipulating those who had
custody and control over her).
18 Hollander, supra note 2, at 7 (citing United States v. Cohen, 888
F.2d 770, 776 (11th Cir. 1989) (the list of purposes in 404(b) for which
the evidence may be admitted is not exclusive)).
19 Hollander, supra note 2, at 6-7 (citing United States v.
Aboumoussallem,726F.2d 906, 911 (2dCir. 1984)). TheAboumoussallem
court gave further guidance: a court should admit the evidence if a
sufficient amount of evidence is available to allow a jury to find
in advance of trial, or during trial if the court excuses pretrial
notice on good cause shown, of the general nature of any such
evidence it intends to introduce at trial.
16
A defendant has a right to present a "vigorous defense," and courts
have acknowledged that Rule 404(b) evidence will aid in that effort. 17 In
fact, it may be easier to introduce 404(b) evidence as the defense attorney
against government witnesses because Rule 404(b) is primarily meant to
protect defendants from undue prejudice. Consequently, some courts
have allowed a more relaxed standard for admission when the bad acts
of witnesses other than the accused are offered.
What is the relaxed standard? It may be simply that defense counsel
must prove that the evidence is not offered to prove action in conformity
therewith. 18 The Second Circuit has ruled that the evidence is subject to
no more than a relevancy determination - whether it is relevant to the
existence or nonexistence of some factpertinent to the defense. The court
elaborated that, in general, the standard need not be a restrictive one
regarding witnesses other than the accused. 19 However, even under the
relaxed standard, defense counsel has the burden of proving that she is
using the evidence in a proper way.
20
Once admissibility is established underRule 404(b),2 the court still
must use Rule 40522 to decide method of proof issues regarding a
defendant's character and Rules 608 and 60923 to decide character issues
regarding other witnesses. The Rule 404(b) advisory committee also
noted that whether "the danger of undue prejudice outweighs the proba-
tive value of the evidence in view of the availability of other means of
proof' as well as "other factors appropriate for making [admissibility]
decisions," should be considered by the judge before 404(b) evidence is
admitted.24
The 1991 amendment to Rule 404(b) added a pre-trial notice
requirement to encourage pre-trial resolution of disputes. The notice
must be filed within a "reasonable" time, and although no particular form
of notice is required, the notice must "apprise the [opposing party] of the
commission of the act; a court should admit the evidence unless it tends
to prove only propensity; a Rule 402 relevancy determination should be
made; and evidence that a prosecution witness could have conducted the
scheme without the defendant's help was admissible.
20 Id. Other courts have not been so generous. The Tenth Circuit
ruled that Fed. R. Evid. 404(b) applies no differently for witnesses' acts
than defendants' acts, and, therefore, no relaxed standard is appropriate.
Hollander, supra note 2, at 7 (citing United States v. Puckett, 692 F.2d
663, 671 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1091 (1982) (evidence that
others had been conned by a codefendant in transactions unrelated and
dissimilar to the crimes charged was properly excluded on relevance
grounds)). The court's ruling, however, was dicta.
21 Huddleston v. UnitedStates, 485 U.S. 681 (1988) (sufficiency of
the evidence is the standard of admissibility for 404(b) evidence).
22 Fed. R. Evid. 405 allows testimony as to reputation and
testimony in the form of an opinion. It is within the court's discretion
whether, on cross examination, inquiry may be made into specific
instances of conduct. Only in cases in which the character of the
defendant is an essential element of the charge may direct examination
delve into specific instances of conduct.
23 Fed. R. Evid. 608 and 609 will be discussed in section IV, V, and
VI of this article.
24 Fed. R. Evid. 404(b), advisory committee notes, 56 F.R.D. 183,
219.
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general nature of the evidence of extrinsic acts." 25 Notably, the 1991
amendment explicitly states that the notice requirement is not meant "to
supersede otherrules of admissibility or disclosure such as the Jencks Act
... nor require the prosecution to disclose directly or indirectly the names
and addresses of its witnesses."'26 However, 404(b) evidence is inadmis-
sible if the notice requirement is not met.
B. Application of the Rule 404(b) Concept in Virginia
Virginia law employs the Rule 404(b) concept by allowing other
crimes, wrongs, or acts to be admissible against the accused if they are
offered for nonpropensity purposes.27 However, evidence of prior bad
acts of witnesses, except those which resulted in convictions,
28 is rarely
admissible.
Evidence of the "character" of a victim in a sex case may be proven
by specific instances of sexual conduct which tend to rebut evidence of
force, threat, or intimidation or tend to prove motive to fabricate the
charge.29 Additionally, evidence of prior false accusations made by the
complaining witness are admissible.30 Likewise, unadjudicated acts of
perjury are admissible, 3 1 as is the character of the victim of a homicide
when the defendant claims self-defense. 32 Because Virginia law tends to
be less favorable in allowing admission of prior bad acts of witnesses
than Federal Rule 404(b), defense counsel should be prepared to articu-
late how the prior bad act is essential to establishing the defense's
contention that someone other than the defendant committed the crime.
Such a contention should be phrased in terms of the Confrontation Clause
and Due Process to ensure that the issues are federalized for later review.
111. Bad Police Habits and Prejudicial Routine7 Departmental
Practices
A. Federal Rule 406
If a police department has a routine practice of conducting part of
an investigation in a particular way which is prejudicial to your client,
evidence of the routine practice may impeach the entire investigation. An
example of such a practice is holding conferences with the prosecuting
attorney during which decisions are made to test only material which is
likely to link your client to the crime or to destroy exculpatory evidence.
Rule 406 can be used both during impeachment of the government's
witnesses and during the defense case to combat such unfair practices.
25 Fed. R. Evid. 404(b) (1991 Amendment notes). Although the
1991 Amendment notes state, "[tihe rule expects that counsel forboth the
defense and the prosecution will submit the necessary request and
information in a reasonable and timely fashion," the unambiguous
language of the rule itself states, "upon request of the accused, the
prosecution in a criminal case shall provide reasonable notice," and
obviates interpretation of the legislative history. Therefore, defense
counsel should not be required to provide notice nor submit 404(b)
information to the prosecution.
26 Id.
27 1 Friend, supra note 14, § 12-15 at 509-510(1993 &Supp. 1995).
28 Evidence of prior convictions will be discussed in section VI.
29 1 Friend, supra note 14, § 5-6 at 185-86. In addition, the accused
may have a constitutional right to present evidence of a victim's sexual
conduct. Id. (Supp. 1995).
30 lid. § 4-2 at 111.
311 id. § 4-2 at 112 (citing Lambert v. Commonwealth, 9 Va. App.
67,383 S.E.2d 752 (1989)).
32 1 id. § 5-9 at 193.
More frequently, circumstances arise in which Rule 406 would be
beneficial in an attempt to admit specific evidence of ineffective inves-
tigation of the crime.33 The particular facts of some cases may allow this
rule to be used against witnesses other than police officers. The rule
states:
Evidence of the habit of a person or of the routine practice of
an organization, whether corroborated or not and regardless of
the presence of eyewitnesses, is relevant to prove that the
conduct of the person or organization on a particular occasion
was in conformity with the habit or routine practice.
34
When using 406, defense counsel must first prove the existence of
the habit or routine practice. Once established, the habit or routine must
be used to prove a specific act on a particular occasion; consequently,
defense counsel must show the likelihood that the routine was followed
during investigation of the defendant's case and how the routine practice
affected the ability of the investigation to produce reliable evidence.
35
An important note upon the practical operation of Rule 406 relates
to the phrase in the rule "regardless of the presence of eyewitnesses."
This phrase has been interpreted broadly enough to mean that evidence
contradicting eyewitness testimony is admissible. For instance, the
Tenth Circuit admitted evidence that a dentist had a habit of advising
patients that extraction of the third molar risks nerve damage.
36 The
victim testified that she was not told of the risk, and the trial court did not
note that it found her to be untruthful. Although the doctor could not
affirmatively state that he did inform her of the risk, the court ruled that
the contradiction between the habit evidence and the victim's eyewitness
testimony should bear upon the weight of the habit evidence, rather than
the overall admissibility. 37 The court explicitly stated that habit and
routine practice evidence is not second class evidence.
38
Although obtaining evidence of bad habits and practices from a
close-knit, protective organization such as a police department may be
difficult, means do exist. Former detectives who have retired and become
investigators for public defenders' offices may provide good starts.
Sometimes a presently employed officer may purposefully or unwit-
tingly provide evidence or leads at some stage of the criminal proceed-
ings. Other criminal defense attorneys are always excellent sources of
information. In some areas, the criminal defense bar has an organized
system for exchanging information on a wide variety of issues.
33 Hollander, supra note 2, at7 (citing UnitedStates v. Laymon, 730
F. Supp. 332, 338 (D. Colo. 1990) (admission of a particular police
officer's pattern of misconduct in making pretextual traffic stops)). See
Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963) and Kyles v. Whitley, 115 S. Ct.
1555 (1995), for precedent that such evidence is both discoverable before
trial and relevant to guilt and penalty determinations. Additionally,
remember that People v. Simpson was good for something: potential
jurors across the nation have seen that police departments can be
incorrigibly ineffective.
34 Fed. R. Evid. 406.
35 Thus, a routine practice of failing to properly preserve DNA
evidence would not be relevant to a defendant's case which did not
involve DNA evidence.
36 Hollander, supra note 2, at 7 (citing Meyer v. United States, 638
F.2d 155 (10th Cir. 1980)).
37 Meyer, 638 F.2d at 157.
38 Id. at 158.
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The rule is, of course, not limited to use as a sword. In a Tenth Circuit
case, for instance, defense counsel used the rule to establish his client's
habit and thereby to shield the client. The defendant, who was charged
with two counts of conspiracy to distribute heroin, was also charged with
possession of a firearm "during and in relation to a drug trafficking
crime."39 The defendant's counsel obtained a subpoena duces tecum for
the defendant's arrest records.40 The records tended to prove that the
defendant, who owned a liquor store, habitually carried a firearm to
protect the proceeds of his business. This habit evidence was relevant to
prove that the defendant was carrying the firearm on the occasion of his
arrest in conformity with his routine practice - to protect his business
profit - thus casting doubt upon the validity of an inference that the
defendant carried the firearm "in relation to a drug trafficking crime." 41
B. Application of the Rule 406 Concept in Virginia
Virginia allows evidence of habit or routine practice, but the case
law is "at best confusing and at worst conflicting." 42 Generally, evidence
of personal habits is excluded and evidence of business customs is
admitted.43 Even if the routine practice of a police department could be
considered a business practice, specific business practices which have
previously been admitted in Virginia courts probably would not apply to
police departments, such as: business practices which assist in the
interpretation of contracts; course of prior dealing between the parties;
and custom in a particular trade. Therefore, counsel, relying on the types
of evidentiary arguments underlying Rule 406, will need to aggressively
argue for and explain the relevancy of habit evidence to the case.
IV. Character Evidence of Untruthfulness
A. Federal Rule 608(a)
Diminishing the credibility of witnesses who are informants, snitches,
police officers, and other persons who instigated the investigation and
prosecution ofyourclient is often done through testimony concerning the
character of such witnesses. Rule 608(a) allows opinions and reputation
evidence of character to impeach witnesses:
The credibility of a witness may be attacked or supported by
evidence in the form of opinion or reputation, but subject to
these limitations:(1) the evidence may refer only to character
39 Hollander, supra note 2, at 8 (citing United States v. Nicholson,
1991 WL 326541 (D. Kan. 1991), affd 983 F.2d 983 (10th Cir. 1993)).
40 Nicholson, 1991 WL 326541 at *10.
41 Id.
42 1 Friend, supra note 14, § 12-13 at 494.
43 Id. at 495. However, the court in Graham v. Commonwealth, 127
Va. 808,103 S.E. 565 (1920), admitted evidence that the homicide victim
was not in the habit of swearing to rebut the defendant's self defense
claim. Id. at496. Graham overruledBowles v. Commonwealth, 103 Va.
816,48 S.E. 527 (1904). Id.
44 Fed. R. Evid. 608(a) (amended 1987, 1988).
45 Character assassination in general is not allowed, and one may
not fortify a witness' credibility with evidence of truthfulness unless her
character has been previously attacked.
46 Charles W. Daniels, Impeaching the Liar and the Fool, The
Champion, Dec. 1992, at 7.
47 Id.
48 Id. In the federal sphere, Fed. R. Evid. 611 requires the court to
"exercise reasonable control over the mode and order of interrogation."
In Virginia, re-cross examination is allowed when new matter has been
for truthfulness or untruthfulness, and (2) evidence of truthful
character is admissible only after the character of the witness
for truthfulness has been attacked by opinion or reputation
evidence or otherwise.44
In a nutshell, defense counsel is allowed to impeach only with
evidence that shows an untruthful character.45 While the operation of the
rule is fairly simple, you may be rewarded for using character witnesses
creatively. One experienced trial lawyer advocates asking the witness
directly what her reputation for truthfulness is. If she answers the
question dishonestly, you may call an adverse character witness to
contradict her or ask her, under 608 (b) about prior bad acts (discussed in
the next section). If the witness admits to being known as a liar, so much
the better.
46
Another tactic suggested by the same author is to attempt to
discredit a prosecution witness with the hope that the adversary will, in
an attempt to rebuild the witness' credibility, probe for the specific
conduct of which is complained.47 Further character evidence favorable
to your client may be placed in front of the jury through the prosecution's
redirect examination, and during such redirect your adversary may
"leave the door ajar" for you to use 608(b)(2) to expose further the
specific conduct on re-cross examination.
48
B. Application of the Rule 608(a) Concept in Virginia
In Virginia, character evidence is generally limited to the evidence
probative of the witness' character for truth and veracity.49 In that sense,
Virginia allows no less than the federal rules. Again, like the provision
in the federal rules, Virginia evidence law allows evidence in support of
a witness' truthfulness only after the witness' truthfulness has been
attacked.50 Likewise, the rules of relevance and prejudice apply to
impeachment character evidence in Virginia just as they do in the federal
system.51 However, unlike in the federal forum where both reputation
and opinion evidence is admissible, in Virginia, opinion evidence, "the
individual impression of a person formed by one single witness," is not
allowed; only reputation evidence is admissible.52 Take note also that
Virginia law does not allow a witness to testify to her own reputation for
truthfulness.53 Therefore, you may not ask a witness to testify to her own
character in order to impeach that testimony with another character
witness unless you are in a federal district court.
brought out during redirect examination. Friend, supra note 14, § 3-14 at
98 (citing 6 Wigmore, Evidence §§ 1897-1899 (1976); McCormick,
Evidence § 32 (3d ed. 1984)). More on Rule 608(b) will follow.
49 1 Friend, supra note 14, § 11 at 197-198 (citing Mitchell v.
Commonwealth, 141 Va. 541,562,127 S.E. 368,375 (1925)); §5-6 at 184
(citing Fry v. Commonwealth, 163 Va. 1085, 177 S.E. 860 (1935);
Cutchin v. Roanoke, 113 Va. 452, 74 S.E. 403 (1912)); 1 id. § 4-2, at 104
(citing Clark v. Commonwealth, 202 Va. 787, 120 S.E.2d 270 (1961);
Bradley v. Commonwealth, 196 Va. 1126, 86 S.E.2d 828 (1955)).
50 1 id. §-5-6 at 184 (citing Smith v. Commonwealth, 212 Va. 675,
187 S.E.2d 191 (1972); Redd v. Ingram, 207 Va. 939, 154 S.E.2d 149
(1967)).
51 1 id. § 4-1 at 101 (citing Powell v. Commonwealth, 13 Va. App.
17, 409 S.E.2d 622 (1991)).
52 lid. § 5-11 at 198 (citing Homestead Fire Ins. Co. v. Ison, 110
Va. 18, 65 S.E. 463 (1909)).
53 1 id. § 5-12 at 199 (citing Burnley v. Commonwealth, 208 Va.
356, 158 S.E.2d 108 (1967)).
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V. Specific Instances of Conduct As Character Evidence
A. Federal Rule 608(b)
Sometimes there may be specific instances of misconduct by the
prosecution witnesses which you would like to expose for impeachment
purposes, perhaps to debunk the basis of knowledge upon which a
character witness has formed her opinion of, or determined the commu-
nity reputation of, another witness. Rule 608(b) provides another im-
peachment tool by allowing inquiry during cross-examination into
specific instances of conduct which are probative of the truthfulness of
a witness; the rule, however, specifically prohibits extrinsic proof of
such conduct. The rule reads as follows:
Specific instances of the conduct of a witness, for the purpose
of attacking or supporting the witness' credibility, other than
conviction of crime as provided in rule 609, may not be proved
by extrinsic evidence. They may, however, in the discretion of
the court, if probative of truthfulness or untruthfulness, be
inquired into on cross-examination of the witness (1) concern-
ing the witness' character for truthfulness or untruthfulness,
or (2) concerning the character for truthfulness or untruthful-
ness of another witness as to which character the witness
being cross-examined has testified.
The giving of testimony, whether by an accused or by any
other witness, does not operate as a waiver of the accused's or
the witness' privilege against self-incrimination when exam-
ined with respect to matters which relate only to credibility.
54
This rule allows you to inquire into a character witness' definition
of truthful character. It also allows you ask the character witness whether
she has knowledge of specific misconduct by the subject of the inquiry
after you describe such misconduct. You would do this in an effort to
expose to the jury the witness' limited scope of knowledge concerning
the subject's character.55 On another note, if your client is testifying,
608(b) provides grounds for objection if the prosecutor attempts to
cross-examine the accused about certain crimes which he may have
committed, but has not been convicted. The rule specifically allows the
accused to retain his right to remain silent when "examined with respect
to matters which relate only to credibility."
'56
How might you gain admission of extrinsic evidence prohibited
under this rule or otherwise get your message across to the jury?
Remember that extrinsic evidence excluded under this rule still may be
allowed under other theories and rules, so be prepared to respond to
54 Fed. R. Evid. 608 (amended 1987, 1988). Evidence of theft
relates to credibility. Daniels, supra note 46, at 8 (citing Varhol v.
National R.R. Passenger Corp., 909 F.2d 1557 (7th Cir. 1990)).
55 You must have good faith belief that the misconduct occurred.
In addition, please note that Fed. R. Evid. 608, advisory committee note,
56 F.R.D. 183, 268, reminds us that Fed. R. Evid. 611 bars harassment
of, and the infliction of undue embarrassment upon, a witness regaidless
of the propriety of any questioning under Fed. R. Evid. 608(b).
56 Fed. R. Evid. 608(a), advisory committee notes, 56 F.R.D. 183,
268 (citing Griffin v. California, 380 U.S. 609 (1965)).
57 Daniels, supra note 46, at 8. An example given by Daniels is
extrinsic evidence of prior misconduct the witness wishes the prosecu-
tion to "forgive" in exchange for his testimony regardless of the lack of
a specific deal to that effect. Id.
58 Id.
59 1 Friend, supra note 14, § 4-2 at 104 (citing among others Wynne
v. Commonwealth, 216 Va. 355, 356-57, 218 S.E.2d 445, 446 (1975);
Lambert v. Commonwealth, 9 Va. App. 67, 383 S.E.2d 752 (1989)).
objections.57 Aside from extrinsic evidence admission, defense counsel
may also refresh the witness' memory with documents under Rule 612
in an effort to force the truth to light or at least arouse the jury's
suspicions.58
B. Application of the Rule 608(b) Concept in Virginia
In Virginia, specific instances of conduct are not generally allowed
to impeach a witness.59 But, as under the federal rule, a character
witness' basis for knowledge may be impeached during cross-examina-
tion by inquiring whether the witness knows of a prior bad act of the
subject of the character inquiry.60 If the prosecutor attempts to force your
client to incriminate herself, object on Fifth Amendment grounds and
cite Griffin v. California as authority.
6 1
As to admission of extrinsic evidence in Virginia, if a witness has
reason to hope to benefit from her testimony, she may be questioned
about her bias. If she denies the bias, she maybe impeached with extrinsic
evidence of deals she has made for her testimony.62 Also, Virginia allows
both oral and written prior inconsistent statements to be introduced as
impeachment evidence.63
VI. Character Evidence: Convictions
A. Federal Rule 609
The availability of prior convictions under Rule 609 to impeach the
accused often is a major factor in deciding whether the defendant will
testify. Defense counsel, however, can also use Rule 609 to force the
prosecutor to conduct a similar cost-benefit analysis for each of her
witnesses. Rule 609(a) states:
For the purpose of attacking the credibility of a witness,
(1) evidence that a witness other than an accused has been
convicted of a crime shall be admitted, subject to Rule 403, if
the crime was punishable by death or imprisonment in excess
of one year under the law under which the witness was
convicted, and evidence that an accused has been convicted of
such a crime shall be admitted if the court determines that the
probative value of admitting this evidence outweighs its preju-
dicial effect to the accused; and
(2) evidence that any witness has been convicted of a crime
shall be admitted if it involved dishonesty or false statement,
regardless of the punishment.6
4
However, prior convictions are admissible as are instances of miscon-
duct which tend to prove matters such as motive or intent. 1 id. § 5-1 at
170. See also the discussion of Virginia evidence parallel to Fed. R. Evid.
609 evidence, infra, and Fed. R. Evid. 404(b) evidence, supra.
60 1 Friend, supra note 14, § 5-13 at 204 (citing Zirkle v. Common-
wealth, 189 Va. 862, 872, 55 S.E.2d 24, 30 (1949)).
61 See footnote 56 supra.
62 1 Friend, supra note 14, § 4-4 at 132 (citing Langhorne v.
Commonwealth, 76 Va. 1012 (1882); Brown v. Commonwealth, 3 Va.
App. 101,348 S.E.2d408 (1986)). SeeBrady,supra note 33, andMoreno
v. Commonwealth, 10 Va.App. 408,392 S.E.2d 836 (1990). 1 id. at 134.
See also Giglio v. United States, 405 U.S. 150 (1972). Additionally, a
defendant has an absolute right to present evidence of bias. 1 Friend,
supra note 14, § 4-4 at 131 (1993 & Supp. 1995).
63 1 Friend, supra note 14, § 4-3, at 119. Additionally, writings may
be used to refresh memory. 1 id. § 3-7 at 75.
64 Fed. R. Evid. 609(a) (amended 1987, 1990).
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The rule allows extrinsic evidence of most felony convictions 65 and
misdemeanor convictions probative of truthfulness to be admitted.
66 It
is no longer required that the evidence be teased out of the witness during
cross examination or that a certified copy be admitted at that time.67
Generally, the conviction must not be more than ten years old, but there
are special circumstances in which the judge may admit older convic-
tions.
68
Resembling Rule 608(b) evidence, evidence excluded by this rule
may be admissible under another theory, such as bias or motive.
69
Nevertheless, be prepared for a Rule 403 objection to this evidence under
all circumstances.
B. Application of the Rule 609 Concept in Virginia
By statute, Virginia allows evidence of prior felony convictions to
be admitted as impeachment evidence.70 Case law allows witnesses tobe
impeached with evidence of convictions of misdemeanors involving
either moral turpitude 71 or the witness' capacity for veracity.
72
While extrinsic evidence of a conviction is allowed under Fed. R.
Evid. 609(a), whether Virginia will allow such evidence is an open
question. Evidence of a conviction may be shown through the witness
herself.73 However, if the witness denies the conviction, defense counsel
should be able to show, through further questioning, that the witness has
"knowingly testified untruthfully about a material fact" - a basis of
impeachment separate from conviction of a crime.74 If the witness
continues to testify falsely, a good argument can be made that fairness
requires that extrinsic evidence of the conviction be admitted to show the
false testimony. 75
65 The rule's advisory committee notes, 56 F.R.D. 183, 270,
indicate that the test for whether any particular crime is a felony is
whether the defendant in that case was subject to imprisonment in excess
of one year.
66 A conviction obtained in violation of the Sixth Amendment
cannot be used to impeach a defendant. 20 Michie's Jurisprudence of
Virginia and West Virginia 681 (A.D. Kowalsky, et. al., eds., 1993)
(citing United States v. Dorman, 496 F.2d 438 (4th Cir.), cert. denied,
419 U.S. 945 (1974)).
67 Daniels, supra note 46, at 8.
68 Fed. R. Evid. 609(b). Defense counsel may argue that the witness
has not been rehabilitated since her crime, and therefore, commission of
the crime is probative of her character.
69 Daniels, supra note 46, at 8.
70 1 Friend, supra note 14, § 4-2 at 106 (citing among case law Va.
Code Ann. § 19.2-269 (1995) ("the fact of conviction may be shown in
evidence to affect [the witness'] credit)). See also 20 Michie's Jur, supra
note 66, § 66 at 675.
71 1 Friend, supra note 14, at 108 (citing among others Johnson v.
Commonwealth, 224 Va. 525,298 S.E.2d 99 (1982)). Cases exist which
state that a felony conviction used to impeach must be one involving
moral turpitude, but the express intent of Va. Code Ann. § 19.2-269
seems quite contrary. 20 Michie's Jur, supra note 66, §66 at 679.
72 1 Friend, supra note 14, at 108 (citing among others McLane v.
Commonwealth, 202 Va. 197, 116 S.E.2d 274 (1960); Harold v. Com-
monwealth, 147 Va. 617, 136 S.E. 658 (1927)).
73 20 Michie's Jur, supra note 66, § 66 at 678 (citing Smith v.
Commonwealth, 155 Va. 1111, 156 S.E. 577 (1931)). If a conviction has
not yet been obtained, but a plea agreement exists between the witness
and the Commonwealth, the details of the plea agreement may be entered
into evidence if a cautionary instruction is given to the jury. 20 id. at 680
(1993 & Supp. 1995) (citing Shanklin v. Commonwealth, 222 Va. 862,
284 S.E.2d 611 (1981)).
It should be noted that Virginia law gives slightly more protection
to an accused than to other witnesses. An accused may be impeached by
prior convictions, but unlike other witnesses who may be asked the
names of the felonies of which they have been convicted, 76 except in the
case of perjury, an accused may be asked only the number of felonies she
has committed.
77
VII. Holding The Government To Its Word
A. Federal Rule 801(d)(2)
If the prosecutor contends that your client has no standing to object
to the admission of a particular piece of evidence, you may be able to
establish an admission that your client did not possess the evidence. In
drug cases, or cases in which a crucial piece of evidence is subject to a
suppression motion, hold the prosecutor to her words by using Rule
801(d)(2):
78
Admission by party opponent. The statement is offered against
a party and is (A) the party's own statement, in either an
individual or representative capacity or (B) a statement of
which the party has manifested an adoption or belief in its
truth, or (C) a statement by a person authorized by the party to
make a statement concerning the subject, or (D) a statement by
the party's agent or servant concerning a matter within the
scope of the agency or employment, made during the existence
of the relationship, or (E) a statement by a coconspirator of a
party during the course and in furtherance of the conspiracy.
79
74 1 Friend, supra note 14, § 4-2 at 107-108 (citing Powell v.
Commonwealth, 13 Va. App. 17,409 S.E.2d 622 (1991) (if a defendant
does not tell the truth when questioned about prior felonies, the Com-
monwealth Attorney may question him further, but may not force him
to divulge the nature of the felonies unless necessary to prove false
testimony and only if the prejudicial effect will outweigh the
probativeness)). See also McAmis v. Commonwealth, 225 Va. 419, 304
S.E.2d 2 (1983). Id. Defense counsel must argue that if the common-
wealth may use this form of impeachment the defense should be given the
benefit of this form as well.
75 In any event, if the evidence you wish to introduce would tend
to show bias on the part of a witness, remember that a defendant has an
absolute right to present evidence of bias. 1 Friend, supra note 14, § 4-
4 at 131 (citing among others Whittaker v. Commonwealth, 217 Va. 966,
234 S.E.2d 79 (1977)).
76 20 Michie's Jur, supra note 66, §66 at 677 (citing Dammerau v.
Commonwealth, 3 Va. App. 285, 349 S.E.2d 409 (1986), overruled on
other grounds, Vescuso v. Commonwealth, 5 Va. App. 59, 360 S.E.2d
547 (1987)).
77 20 Michie's Jur, supra note 66, § 39 at 611 (citing Sadoski v.
Commonwealth, 219 Va. 1069,254 S.E.2d 100 (1979)). Additionally, an
accused is entitled to show the nature of the charge, that she was
convicted on conflicting evidence, and that she had served her time, been
pardoned, or paroled. 20 id. § 66 at 681. A defendant must be allowed
to show limited evidence that she was convicted on the basis of perjured
testimony. Id.
78 Hollander, supra note 2, at 9. Fed. R. Evid. 801(d)(2) can be a
pitfall for defense attorneys as well. Id. The Second Circuit held in
United States v. McKeon, 738 F.2d 26,29 (2d Cir. 1984) that admissions
made by an attorney in his opening statement during the defendant's
former trial may eliminate the need for further proof on a given element
of an offense. Id.
79 Fed. R. Evid. 801(d)(2) (amended 1975, 1987).
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The government frequently uses this rule to admit a defendant's or
coconspirator's statement. Because the government has been deemed to
be a party-opponent of the defendant in criminal proceedings, 80 the rule
may be used by the defense as well.
The rule allows a statement offered for proof of the matter asserted
to be admitted if the statement is: offered against a party and either is a)
a party's own statement; b) a statement of which the party has manifested
an adoption or belief in its truth; or c) a statement of the party's agent or
servant concerning a matter within the scope of the agency or employ-
ment.8 1 The Fourth Circuit has held that a statement is binding on the
government if it is a clear and unambiguous admission. 82 A statement
made to obtain a search warrant, for example, is adopted by the govern-
ment and may be introduced against the government under Rule
801(d)(2).
83
Other exculpatory evidence may be found in the admissions of the
government.84 Bills of particulars are an excellent source of admissions.
Confidence in the justice system depends upon the courts holding the
government to its bill unless an explanation for variance therefrom is
accepted by the court. A fundamental change in the prosecution's version
of the facts must be explained or it cannot be concealed from the trier of
fact. 85 Admissions during pre-trial proceedings are also relevant.
86
Even in the appellate process, admissions are important. The
government may lose its right to challenge the standing of the defendant
on appeal because it adopted an inconsistent position on the issue at
trial. 87 However, the government does not vouch for the credibility of
each statement it introduces. 88 Therefore, not all statements of prosecu-
tion witnesses will be admissions of the government.
80 Hollander, supra note 2, at 8 (citing United States v. Morgan, 581
F.2d 933, 937 n. 10 (D.C. Cir. 1978)(after the government has filed a
sworn affidavit that it believes particular statements are trustworthy, it
cannot then object on hearsay grounds to admission of the affidavit)).
81 Id. (citing McCormickonEvidence,447-70 (4thed. 1992)). The
rule classifies such statements as "not hearsay," but in reality the rule is
merely excepting old fashioned hearsay statements from exclusion under
the hearsay rule because of the reliability of the particular class of hearsay
to which they belong.
82 Id. (citing United States v. Blood, 806 F.2d 1218, 1221 (4th Cir.
1986)). The Blood court held that the inadvertent use of the word
"insurance" in the government's opening statement and in the proposed
voir dire questions were not admissions that the plan at issue was not an
ERISA plan and therefore, dismissal of the ERISA criminal charges was
not required. Given that the Virginia courts often adopt the Fourth
Circuit's case law, chances are that this is the'test in Virginia.
83 Id. (citing United States v. Ramirez, 894 F.2d 565, 570 (2d Cir.
1990)). The court did not decide this issue because it found the admission
to be nonprejudicial. However, the court cited United States v. Morgan,
581 F.2d 933, 937-38 (D.C. Cir. 1978) as support for admission of the
admission.
84 Hollander, supra note 2, at 8 (citing United States v. Kattar, 840
F.2d 118 (1st Cir. 1988)). The government's briefs from prosecution of
the Church of Scientology were admissible during the trial of a defendant
charged with extortion from the church because the prosecution por-
trayed the church as "virtuous"; see also United States v. Powers, 467
F.2d 1089, 1097 n.1 (7th Cir.1972)(Stevens, J., dissenting))(Stevens
wrote a powerful dissent as the Court ruled that no error was committed
when the government's previous successful prosecution of a codefen-
dant was ruled inadmissible although it was obtained by maintaining that
the codefendant received the whole of two checks for which Powers was
subsequently charged with obtaining the whole of by mail fraud.)
Evidence such as this may be discoverable pre-trial under Brady and
Kyles, supra note 33.
Other potential sources of admissions by the government include:
pretrial motions, argument, other related cases, an informant's credibil-
ity with the prosecution, transcripts of an informant's pleas and sentenc-
ing hearings, statements by prosecutors about experts, and admissions of
the non-lawyer agents of the government (such as police officers,
customs officials, IRS agents, professional chemists, fingerprint experts,
and accountants) in yours or other cases.89 Attorneys should keep files
of testimony and statements made by these lay people for future refer-
ence. During trial, counsel should keep notes on statements which
possibly may be used on appeal.
B. Application of the Rule 801(d)(2) Concept in Virginia
Generally, Virginia evidence law allows admissions by party-
opponents to be admitted into evidence.90 Whether admissions by
government attorneys are admissible against the government in criminal
cases in Virginia appears to be an open question.
Party admissions made by those with express or implied authority
to speak on behalf of a party may be admissible, 9 land government
attorneys are no doubt agents of the government. The Virginia test for
determining whether an agent's statement may be held against the
principal includes whether the agent was acting within the scope of the
agent's employment and whether the agent had authority to make
statements on behalf of the principal.92 Additionally, attorneys' "judi-
cial admissions" generally are admissible against their clients, and their
extra-judicial admissions are not.93 As the government is effectively the
government attorney's "client," statements made in court by government
attorneys should be admissible against other government attorneys.
85 Hollander, supra note 2, at 8 (citing United States v. GAF Corp.,
928 F.2d 1253 (2d Cir. 1991)). The GAF Corp. court held that initial bill
of particulars can be admitted as an admission of the government
especially when the government's rebuttal summation labels beliefs
stated in the bill as smoke screens created by the defendant.
86 Id. (citing United States v. Van Griffin, 874 F.2d 634, 638 (9th
Cir. 1989)(proof of the measures necessary for a reliable nystagmus test
for drunkenness may be shown by admission of a government manual
which is relevant to the particular branch of the government and is
competent evidence)).
87 Id. (citing United States v. Morales, 737 F.2d 761,763 (8th Cir.
1984)(the government shall not argue constructive possession at trial and
lack of standing to challenge the search on appeal. The court did not
speak of admissions, but of the lack of a government "right" to change
positions on appeal.)) See also Hollander, supra note 2, at 8 (citing
among others Steagald v. United States, 451 U.S. 204 (1981)).
88 United States v. Riggs, 537 F.2d 1219 (4th Cir. 1976).
89 Barbara Bergman, et. al., Samurai Lawyer: Aggressive Use of
Underutilized Evidence Rules, supplement p. 1, April 28, 1995, (The
Louisiana Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers).
90 Ronald J. Bacigal & Thomas F. Guernsey, Admissibility of
Evidence in Virginia 4 (1990) (citing Tyree v. Lariew, 208 Va. 382,385,
158 S.E.2d 140, 143 (1967)).
91 Id. at 8 (citing Eller v. Blackwelder, 204 Va. 292,295, 130 S.E.2d
426,428 (1963)).
92 2 Friend, supra note 14, § 18-37 at 220.
93 1 id. § 18-39 at 224.
94 Id. (Supp. 1995) (citing among othersHall v. Commonwealth, 16
Va. 779, 433 S.E.2d 489 (1993)). The court held that the defendant's
claim at the suppression hearing of a possessory interest in the contra-
band was admissible against him at trial.
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Likewise, factual statements in pleadings and in suppression hear-
ings may be used to impeach a party.94 In addition, admissions of fact in
final pleadings (pleadings upon which the case goes to trial), and
evidential admissions in pleadings which are withdrawn or otherwise
amended also generally are admissible against the parties for whom the
attorney acted.95 Whether these rules of evidence are equally applicable
against Commonwealth attorneys is an open question.
VIII. Impeaching The Most Vulnerable Witnesses: Declarants
Who Do Not Appear At Trial
A. Federal Rule 806
Suppose the prosecutor has just finished direct examination of a
witness who testified to admissible hearsay. Besides attacking the
veracity of the witness, how might defense counsel discredit the testi-
mony? Hearsay declarants are witnesses as much as those witnesses who
do appear, and, therefore, can be impeached with prior or subsequent
inconsistent statements. Defense counsel may also impeach any witness
by showing evidence which contradicts part of the witness' testimony.
Such evidence is particularly helpful if the judge grants an instruction
allowing the jury to use the giving of false testimony as a factor when
weighing the credibility of the witness' entire statement.
96
If at all possible, Rule 806 must be used to attack declarants who do
not appear at trial. The rule reads as follows:
When a hearsay statement, or a statement defined in the Rule
801 (d)(2), (C), (D), or (E), has been admitted in evidence, the
credibility of the declarant may be attacked, and if attacked
may be supported, by any evidence which would be admissible
for those purposes if declarant had testified as a witness.
Evidence of a statement or conduct by the declarant at any
time, inconsistent with the declarant's hearsay statement, is
not subject to any requirement that the declarant may have
been afforded an opportunity to deny or explain. If the party
95 1 id. § 18-47 at 243-44.
96 Daniels, supra note 46, at 8. However, the admission of extrinsic
evidence on a collateral matter (i.e., not the issue of guilt or punishment)
is limited by case law. Id. The 1991 edition of Weistein's Evidence at
pages 607-79 suggests that a Fed. R. Evid. 403 analysis is helpful in
assessing the admissibility of evidence on a collateral matter. Id.
97 Fed. R. Evid. 806 (amended 1987).
98 Hollander, supra note 2, at 9 (citing United States v. Hale, 422
U.S. 171, 176 (1975)). Although not directly on point because it deals
with the inadmissibility of post-arrest silence as a "statement" inconsis-
tent with an affirmative defense, this case nonetheless stands for the
proposition stated in the above text. On another note, to examine the
rationale of pre-federal rules cases regarding admission of subsequent
inconsistent statements, see People v. Rosoto, 373 P.2d 867 (Cal. 1962),
modified on other grounds, 401 P.2d 220 (Cal. 1965) and People v.
Collup, 167 P.2d 714 (Cal. 1946) (which both upheld the admissibility
of subsequent statements) and see Mattox r. United States, 156 U.S. 237
(1895) and People v. Hines, 29 N.E.2d 483 (N.Y. 1940), overruled on
other grounds, 282 N.E.2d 312 (N.Y. 1972) (which both struck down
such admissibility.) Id. For the rule regarding admission of prior
inconsistent testimony as substantive evidence see Fed. R. Evid. 613(b)
and Fed. R. Evid. 801(d)(l)(A).
99 As one authority has suggested, if a witness is available for that
purpose, there is no requirement that she be allowed to explain or deny
at trial; if a witness becomes available to testify after she has been
impeached, it is questionable whether she was in fact unavailable in the
first place, and fairness would dictate that she not be allowed to testify for
the limited purpose of explaining away her shortfalls.
against whom a hearsay statement has been admitted calls the
declarant as a witness, the party is entitled to examine the
declarant on the statement as if under cross-examination.
97
The reason for the rule is fairness to the party against whom the
declarant's hearsay evidence is admitted: the impeaching party has
already been denied cross-examination by the declarant's unavailability;
therefore, that party should at least have the benefit of impeachment. The
windfall to the impeaching party is that such declarants are not available
to defend their inconsistent statements or actions.
Under Rule 806, the court may admit almost any prior or subsequent
inconsistent statement to impeach the declarant. 98 The rule states explic-
itly that admissibility does not depend upon whether "the declarant may
previously have been afforded an opportunity to deny or explain."99
Be creative and examine all of your options. For instance, a witness'
demeanor during prior written testimony (as well as any statement he
made regarding such testimony) may be admitted for impeachment
purposes. 100 Of course, an absent child's testimony can be impeached on
numerous grounds including incompetency to testify.10 t
B. Application of the Rule 806 Concept in Virginia
When impeaching out-of-court declarants in Virginia, remember
that witnesses can be impeached with forms of evidence which contradict
present testimony.1 02 Forms of inconsistent evidence admissible in
Virginia are prior testimony, 103 prior inconsistent statements, prior
inconsistent conduct, written statements, transcripts, depositions, and
interrogatories. 104 Virginia evidence law is unsettled as to whether one
can impeach with subsequent inconsistent statements or actions.
Prior inconsistent statements may be used to impeach whether they
are written or oral and whether the testimony was taken in open court or
by the introduction of a deposition. 105 Prior inconsistent conduct is
available for impeachment under the same rules which apply to prior
inconsistent statements. 1
06
100 Hollander, supra note 2, at 9 (citing People '. Rosoto, 373 P.2d
867, 885 (Cal. 1962) modified on other grounds, 401 P.2d 220 (Cal.
1965)(defense called court reporter to state that the (now deceased)
witness "shook visibly while testifying" and told her that he had to testify
that way under threat of death; ruled proper impeachment with prior
inconsistent statement)).
101 Id.
102 1 Friend, supra note 14, § 4-3, at 119 (citing among others Hall
v. Commonwealth, 233 Va. 369, 355 S.E.2d 591 (1987); Neblett v.
Hunter, 207 Va. 335, 150 S.E.2d 115 (1966); cases collected in 20
Michie's Jur. Witnesses § 56 (1979)). Note that a foundation must be
provided for such impeachment. Seeid. at 121-122(1993 & Supp 1995).
See also id. at 124 for rules regarding admission of prior inconsistent
testimony as substantive evidence.
103 Virginia law requires that if prior testimony is to be admitted
against a party in the present action, she must have been a party in the
former trial. Additionally, the issues must be substantially the same in
both trials. 2 id. § 18-10, at 116-119.
104 1 Friend, supra note 13, § 4-3, at 119.
105 Id. But see Va. Code § 19.2-270 (1995). Id. The statute states,
"[iln a criminal prosecution, other than for perjury, or in an action on a
penal statute, evidence shall not be given against the accused of any
statement made by him as a witness upon a legal examination, in a
criminal or civil action, unless such statement was made when examined
as a witness in his own behalf."
106 lid. at 121.
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The Virginia procedure for introducing evidence may limit the
availability of the Rule 806 concept in state courts. Impeachment by
written statement requires that the witness' attention be drawn to the time
the statement was made and that she be asked whether she made the
writing. 107 This procedure arguably would seem to preclude the use of
impeachment by written statement for hearsay evidence as the declarant
herself could not be alerted to the statement and the witness relaying the
hearsay testimony would have no response. It may be, however, that
Virginia courts have not yet anticipated such a situation, and that, out of
fairness, the courts would adopt a Rule 806 approach.
In Virginia, it is possible that an unavailable declarant will have
made one of the following admissible hearsay statements to which the
Rule 806 concept might apply: dying declarations, and declarations
against interest; 10 8 and excited utterances, pleas of guilty or nolo
contendre resulting in convictions, present sense impressions, recent
complaints in sexual assault actions, recorded recollections, statements
concerning personal or family relationships, statements for purposes of
medical diagnosis or treatment, then existing mental or emotional
conditions, and then existing physical conditions. A witness may be
called to testify to such declarations as all are exceptions to the hearsay
rule in Virginia. Defense counsel may wish to consider ways to use the
concept of Federal Rule 806 when confronted with such testimony in
Virginia courts.
IX. Suppressing Non-probative And Prejudicial Course
Of Investigation Evidence
Prosecutors and police often attempt to provide the jury with
testimony concerning the investigation of your client. Frequently, such
testimony is very prejudicial, yet it is irrelevant, hearsay, or excludable
under Rule 403.
Many facts learned during the investigation are not probative of
guilt or innocence, and testimony concerning them simply arouses the
jury's emotions. Information received by radio dispatch or 911 calls is
commonly elicited by prosecutors to show the officer's reasons for
suspecting your client or their reason for going to a certain location. The
Third Circuit109 held that, in light of the officers' sighting and pursuit of
107 1 id. at 122 (citing Va. Code §§ 19.2-268.1 (1995) and 8.01-404
(1950) (concept applied in Epps v. Commonwealth, 190 Va. 93, 56
S.E.2d 237 (1949)).
108 Declarations against interest can be admissible hearsay in
Virginia only if the declarantis unavailable to testify. 2 id. § 18-12 at 127
(1993 & Supp. 1995) (citing among others Yellow Cab Co. v. Eden, 178
Va. 325,16 S.E.2d 625 (1941); Eppes v. Eppes, 169 Va. 778,195 S.E. 694
(1938)).
109 Bergman, supra note 89, at supp. 1 (citing United States v.
Sallins, 993 F.2d 344 (3d Cir. 1993)).
110 Id. Furthermore, the contents of both communications was
hearsay, as will be discussed below.
111 778 F.2d 59, 61 (1st Cir. 1985). Id. See also United States v.
Taylor, 900 F.2d 779 (1990) (reason for beginning the investigation had
no relevance and was highly prejudicial). Id.
112 Id. (citing Lamberty, 778 F.2d at 61).
the defendant at the scene, it was not necessary for the officers to explain
that they went to the scene because of a radio dispatch and a 911 call
which described a black man dressed in black carrying a gun. 110
Similarly, the reasons why postal inspectors began an investigation had
no probative value according to the court in UnitedStates v. Lamberty. 111
In Lamberty, the agents testified that they planted a package at the post
office because they had received information that the defendant had been
stealing packages which were sent to that office by mistake. The court
held the admission of this testimony reversible error.
112
Communications such as those described above also contain a good
deal of excludable hearsay. The Third Circuit found that although a 911
tape itself could be introduced through the business records exception to
Rule 803, the description on the tape of the defendant was excludable
hearsay because the 911 caller did not appear at trial. 113 The catch phrase
"hearsay within hearsay" is used to describe such a situation. The court
held that widespread abuse of such evidence places upon courts a duty to
determine "whether the ostensible hearsay purpose is valid." 114 In a
Second Circuit case,115 the testimony of a customs agent that two
individuals had implicated the defendant in the crime of conspiracy to
import narcotics was ruled inadmissible. 116 The agent also testified to
information relayed to her by another witness about the meaning of
certain writing on a matchbook cover.1 17 The court condemned the use
of investigation evidence in this way unless non-controversial issues are
discussed or when allegations by a defendant must be rebutted. 118 The
court strongly suggested that prosecutors should make a proffer of
hearsay evidence before trial if problems of this magnitude are antici-
pated.119
Defense counsel is advised to anticipate objectionable testimony
when the prosecution asks an officer why he went to the scene, whether
he pursued the defendant after speaking with any other witness, or
whether he believed that "someone" was involved in criminal activity
after speaking with another witness.
120
This article has presented a sampler of ways in which the concepts
behind the Federal Rules of Evidence may be used in Virginia state
courts. I encourage the reader to use these concepts to develop unconven-
tional ways of applying Virginia evidence law and thereby participate in
the evolution of that law.
113 Sallins, 993 F.2d at 347. See also Zemo v. State, 646 A.2d 1050
(Md. 1994) (testimony that an informant had apprised the officer of the
defendant's guilt was inadmissible hearsay and its admission violated the
confrontation clause).
114 Sallins, 993 F.2d at 346. The court cited United States v.
Bettelyoun, 892 F.2d 744,746 (8th Cir. 1989) for the proposition that the
absence of a non-hearsay purpose establishes that the evidence was used
to prove the truth of the matter asserted. 993 F.2d at 347.
115 Bergman, supra note 89, at supp. 2 (citing United States v.
Reyes, 18 F.3d 65,70 (2d Cir. 1994)).
116 Reyes, 18 F.3d at 67.
117 Id. at 68.
118 Id. at 71. The Reyes opinion explains very well the difference
between admissible and nonadmissible state of mind evidence.
119 Bergman, supra note 89, atsupp. 2 (citingReyes, 18 F.3d at72).
120 Id.
